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Some 80 years after the Great Depression the stream of analysis of causes and of actual or 
hypothetical alternative policies continues. The analysis of the present crisis, particularly the 
question of how to deal with it, are still in a very early stage. The most recent contributions 
are largely reactions to the 700 billion dollar bailout of the financial sector proposed by 
treasury secretary Paulson and after some modifications passed into law. While a scholarly 
article is not going to impact the current crisis management in the US or elsewhere, hopefully 
it can contribute to understanding and to better decisions in the future. 
 I discuss briefly the crisis itself and then give some criteria that should be used in 
evaluating any policy proposed to deal with it. This is followed by a critical discussion of 
some of the policy measures that have been suggested. Finally, I give a list of proposals, that I 
believe best satisfy the stated criteria. In contrast to almost all of the proposals that have been 
made, mine involve no bailout of the financial sector with public funds.  
The Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
The immediate mechanisms leading to the crisis are fairly clear and agreed upon. Moreover, 
this understanding has been available for some time. I quote from a column of Paul Krugman 
titled Mystery of the mortgage mess and dated November 17, 2007: 
There's a very good Economic Letter from the Dallas Fed about the housing crisis, which explains a lot 
about how the mess happened. In short: lenders began making lots of dubious loans in large part because 
they were able to slice and dice the loans and sell them off to investors who didn't know what they were 
buying. My only fault with the letter is that it doesn't emphasize the extent to which borrowers were also 
suckered in. 
Even earlier, on July 2, 2007 Krugman had written: 
What do you get when you cross a Mafia don with a bond salesman? A dealer in collateralized debt, 
obligations (C.D.O.'s) - someone who makes you an offer you don't understand. 
Seriously, it's starting to look as if C.D.O.'s were to this decade's housing bubble what Enron-style 
accounting was to the stock bubble of the 1990s. Both made investors think they were getting a much 
better deal than .they really were. And the new scandal raises two obvious questions: Why were the bond-
rating agencies taken in (again), and where were the regulators? 
 Few would quarrel with this analysis today. The only element missing then and to some 
extent missing still is knowledge the magnitude of C.D.O.’s that were issued and of the 
amounts held by individual financial institutions. The crisis has been out in the open and its 
nature pretty well understood for some time. It is surprising that the discussion of how to deal 
with it has begun so late and is still far from a consensus on what needs to be done. 
Criteria for Judging Proposed Measures 
Very generally the criteria for any kind of government action are the same: achieving a 
maximum of efficiency and fairness. Efficiency in this case means restoring the financial 
system to normal functioning and doing so at minimum cost. Fairness means distributing the 
costs and benefits of the action among the various groups involved in a manner that is felt to 
be fair by a majority of the population. Fairness in relation to the current crisis requires a 
consideration of the treatment of the following groups: The top managements of financial 
institutions, particularly of those firms that have become or are close to becoming 
dysfunctional; the ordinary employees of these firms; their stockholders; the general 
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population; tax payers; last but not least, the borrowers under subprime mortgages, many of 
whom are in financial difficulty, or even facing foreclosure. 
 For many types of government actions, particularly in the economic sphere, a necessary 
condition for the achievement efficiency and fairness is that the action must be in accordance 
with clearly stated and explicit rules that can be communicated to the general public and can 
gain public support. In the absence of such rules, the bureaucracies charged with carrying out 
a policy tend to operate badly. This is particularly true in the present crisis. Given the mighty 
lobby of the financial industry, procedures that are not transparent are likely to favour them at 
the expense of the public. Even in the unlikely case that such procedures would be completely 
fair, the public would still suspect that undue advantages were gained by those present at the 
negotiating tables. Explicit and binding rules also have the advantage that they can be 
implemented more rapidly than procedures that may involve protracted negotiations and 
bargaining, also an important consideration in the present crisis. 
Proposed Solutions: Paulsen and Beyond 
The initial Paulson bailout proposal qualifies as a textbook example of how not to do it. It is 
totally unfair in that it involves a vast transfer from those already damaged by the crisis, the 
tax payers, to those who caused it and reaped substantial gains while the going was good, the 
executives and shareholders of the financial industry. Moreover, at least in the initial version, 
there was no compensation going in the opposite direction. Also, the proposed transfers are to 
be made at the sole discretion of the Secretary and are thus totally lacking in transparency. 
Finally, there is nothing in the proposal designed to make the financial industry act more 
responsibly in the future. On the contrary, the giant bailout increases moral hazard and 
encourages equally irresponsible future behaviour. 
 Modifications of the proposal following its initial justified rejection by the House of 
Representatives involved mainly cosmetic changes plus some unrelated goodies to make the 
package more acceptable.. Thus, congressional oversight, in the absence of clear criteria, does 
not produce transparency. A modification to the original Paulson proposal that has been 
suggested and appears to have been adopted in the latest modification is that taxpayers should 
get some equity in return. This is eminently fair, but raises further problems. 
 The lack of transparency in pricing the distressed assets that the treasury wishes to buy 
could plausibly be dealt with by holding auctions. Ausubel and Cramton (2008) have 
suggested that the treasury hold reverse auctions for this purpose. According to Bajaj (2008), 
the same idea has also been advanced by the Treasury and it is found in the revised versions 
of the Paulson plan. The pricing of distressed CDO’s is however very difficult under any 
mechanism. Bajaj discusses this in general terms and Stiglitz (2008a) specifically in relation 
to the auction proposal: 
The administration attempts to assure us that they will protect the American people by insisting on buying 
the mortgages at the lowest price at auction. Evidently, Paulson didn't learn the lessons of the information 
asymmetry that played such a large role in getting us into this mess. The banks will pass on their lousiest 
mortgages. Paulson may try to assure us that we will hire the best and brightest of J Wall Street to make 
sure that this doesn't happen. (Wall Street firms are already licking their lips at the prospect of a new 
source of revenues: fees from the US Treasury.) But even Wall Street’s best and brightest do not exactly 
have a credible record in asset valuation; if they had done better, we wouldn't be where we are. And that 
assumes that they are really working for the American people, not their long-term employers in financial 
markets. Even. if they do use some fancy mathematical model to value different mortgages, those in Wall 
Street have long made money by gaming against these models. We will then wind up not with the 
absolutely lousiest mortgages, but with those in which Treasury's models most underpriced risk. Either 
way, we the taxpayers lose, and Wall Street gains. 
Based on the articles of Bajaj and Stiglitz, it seems clear that while auctions may be better 
than pure discretion, they are not a good solution. 
 An entirely different approach is taken by Leamer (2008). He takes the central element in 
the crisis to be the decline in housing prices and he proposes to address the problem directly: 
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 One honest way to transfer the losses directly to the taxpayers would have the Treasury buy homes 
directly at inflated prices and rent them to deserving Americans. Though the Treasury Plan involves 
buying mortgage backed securities at inflated prices, keep in mind that foreclosures will then turn the 
homes over to Uncle Sam. For $700 billion, the Treasury could purchase 2.3 million homes at an average 
“affordable” share based on their household income, and the government’s subsidy would be spread over 
the duration of the mortgage, rather than being an immediate payout of three quarters of a trillion dollars 
to financial institutions. 
 While I have complete sympathy with the idea of directly helping home owners rather than 
financial institutions, I disagree with both Leamer’s premise and his conclusion. Leamer 
attributes the mortgage defaults to falling housing prices. The reality is not only that there is 
mutual causation between these variables, but that in addition there are distinct causes 
operating on each. The principal causes of the rise in mortgage defaults are: a. The poor 
creditworthiness of recipients of subprime mortgages. b. The general rise in interest rates, 
leading to increases in interest on variable interest mortgages. Falling housing prices play a 
role in that families about to default find it more difficult to sell the house and move to a 
cheaper one. This is hardly the major cause and fixing it would not remove the other two. 
Leamer’s proposed solution would turn the government into a gigantic real estate agent 
dealing with millions of homes all over the United States. Each home is different in quality 
and location. That is why real estate agent are usually small or medium sized local operations; 
the government is ill suited to this task. In addition, Leamer’s proposal requires a new welfare 
bureaucracy to determine the needs and paying abilities of families. There must be a better 
way! 
 A simpler and in my view better way to help home owners is the voucher plan advocated 
by Barton (2008) and similarly by Stiglitz (2008b). However, Dix (2008) points to a moral 
hazard problem created by the voucher proposal. What I don’t like about these proposals is 
that it is still the taxpayer who foots the bill to compensate the financial industry for the losses 
that they would (and should) otherwise incur.  
 The analysis that I like best is that of Edlin (2008) because: a. He proposes a 
comprehensive approach incorporating several distinct elements. b. He distinguishes between 
‘fire fighting’ the current crisis and longer term reforms. c. He advocates what I agree is the 
most important immediately required measure: full insurance for all deposits. 
 Edlin’s other proposals may be described as ‘bailout light’: buy some toxic assets; inject 
some equity into the financial sector. I think that this is better than the plan that has just been 
adopted, but I am against any bailout. 
Saving the Financial Sector at No Cost to the Taxpayer 
a. As the first prong of my plan I shamelessly adopt Edlin’s proposal for insurance of all 
deposits and assurance of payments. I have nothing to add to his analysis, however I want to 
point in this connection to the article by (my former teacher) Telser (2007) who wrote: 
LESSONS FROM BERNANKE 
Ben Bernanke provided a better explanation of the Great Depression back in 1983 in a seminal article in 
the American Economic Review: widespread bank failures were the critical factor behind the Great 
Depression. Markets cannot function without acceptable means of payments. Bank failures caused people 
to lose confidence in the safety of their deposits. More than 17 percent of all National Banks never re-
opened their doors after the end of the Bank Holiday declared by President Roosevelt in March 1933. The 
real job of the Fed was one it failed to do: to maintain the solvency of banks. The Great Depression was 
the result. 
I don’t know if Bernanke was instrumental in raising the limit on insured deposits from 100 
thousand to 250 thousand dollars. This may not be enough; all deposits should be insured! 
 On the evening of the day that I wrote the above, the German government announced that 
it was guaranteeing all accounts. The Irish government insured all accounts a few days ago, 
resulting in massive capital flows from British to Irish banks. This shows that an action that is 
desirable taken by itself may not be desirable when taken unilaterally in an interdependent 
system. The Greek government has also insured all accounts. 
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b. Transparency has been the buzzword in international discussions of the financial crisis. At 
the G8 conference at Heiligendamm in June 2007, the German delegation strongly pushed for 
greater transparency in international finance, but was blocked by the Americans and the 
British. Now the subject is at the top of the international agenda. This is all to the good, but to 
ameliorate the present crisis I propose instant transparency. All financial institutions should 
be required to reveal the face value of their holdings of CDO’s within ten days. This would 
immediately remove the biggest source of uncertainty in the financial system. 
c. The simplest, fastest, most cost effective and fairest way to help subprime borrowers and to 
restore value to subprime mortgages and derived CDO’s is to pass a law that would reduce the 
payments due under these mortgages by some fixed proportion. A reduction in the range of 
20-40 percent should be enough to very largely eliminate defaults. The flow of payments 
under these mortgages would resume with the result that the derived securities would again 
become as marketable as any other assets. The reduction in their value should be in about the 
same proportion as the reduction in interest payments. The loss relative to the initial face 
value would be borne by the financial industry, which is as it should be! Fairness requires the 
reduction to be retroactive. Since the law would apply only to existing mortgages, no moral 
hazard is created. 
d. Several of the authors cited advocate an injection of funds into the financial sector in return 
for equity. The proposals have however remained vague. How much is to be injected into a 
given institution? How is the corresponding equity share to be determined? What role is to be 
assigned to the funds thus obtained? I make instead a proposal that is completely clear and 
definite in all of these respects. 
 My starting point is the article by Telser (2008). He shows that as a consequence of 
deregulation the ratio of reserves kept by banks against their deposits has effectively declined 
to zero. I propose that this deregulation should be reversed and that bank should be required 
to maintain a traditional reserve ratio of say five percent. The government should offer to give 
them the required funds against equity. The equity shares should be valued at market prices.  
e. The above measures would improve the condition of the financial sector and substantially 
reduce, but not eliminate, the risk of bankruptcy. I don’t see bankruptcy as the huge problem 
that it is generally made out to be. Bankruptcy by itself does not in any way reduce the human 
and physical resources present in a firm. After reorganization and the installation of a new 
management, these resources may be more productive than before. Bankruptcy in fact plays a 
similar role in a market economy as physical death does in biology; there the purpose is to 
assure the health and survival of the species, here of the market economy.  
 This proposal is in the spirit of Beim (2008) who wrote:  
A central feature of good bailouts is that the shareholders of insolvent banks are wiped out and their 
senior management is dismissed. Why? Because these are the people who created the problem, they must 
be seen to pay a high price. Remember that most banks are conservative, well-run and solvent; only a 
minority got over-extended. 
Conclusion 
I reviewed and criticized various proposals to deal with the ‘firestorm’ of the current financial 
crisis and advanced several proposals of my own. Equally important is the question of how to 
construct a new financial architecture that is less prone to such conflagrations. How well that 
question is answered and the answer translated into actual policy will significantly impact the 
evolution of the new century. Stay tuned. 
Update 
Events are unfolding with great rapidity. The Paulson plan that was center stage when I began 
to write this note is dead. Beginning with Germany, various countries have initiated large 
programs in support of the financial sector. These, as well as the revised US program have 
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largely espoused at least in principle the idea expressed in my heading that the programs 
should at least in principle and in the long run involve no costs to the taxpayers. 
 One aspect of the German experience is relevant in relation to my proposals. To the 
surprise and disappointment of the German government, none of the private sector German 
banks have thus far applied for any part of the aid package. The apparent reason is that no 
bank wants to bear the onus of being the first to apply for aid. It would have been better to 
force them to act by mandating a certain level of reserves, as I proposed. 
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